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 ABSTRACT 
There is an increasing focus on the potential for financial products to improve the 
welfare of smallholder farmers in developing countries. This paper reports on research 
conducted in the Machakos region of Kenya to understand the credit rationing status 
of smallholder households and the potential of a novel financial product, risk 
contingent credit (RCC), to open access to credit markets for households who may 
have previously voluntarily withdrawn from the credit markets. We find that 
households do not show a preference for RCC as compared to a normal credit offering, 
but that the intervention did lead to quantity and risk rationed households acting in a 
similar manner to the price rationed households. These findings highlight the 
importance of extending credit access to agricultural smallholders and point to the 
need for further research into RCC.  
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
There is a global shift underway. Over the last 10-15 years, there has been a 
growing number of entrepreneurs, impact investors, foundations, and development 
finance institutions focused on delivering market-based, profit-generating, socially and 
environmentally sustainable solutions to people living at the base of the economic 
pyramid (Dassel and Cassidy, 2017). Inspired by the global commitments to achieving 
a sustainable future, such as the Sustainable Development Goals and the Paris Climate 
Accord, there are a group of these individuals and institutions that are focused on 
increasing productivity, resilience, and well-being of smallholder farmers across the 
planet. Many of the solutions focus on increasing access to financial services such as 
credit and insurance, as access to financial markets has been found to help overcome 
barriers that may trap households in poverty (Skees and Barnett, 2006).  While 
microfinance has a rich history dating back to the founding of Grameen Bank in 1983, 
there has been limited success in using microfinance to improve the livelihood 
outcomes of the rural, agrarian poor who are often locked out of markets and only 
produce for subsistence. However, there has been an increasing recognition that 
agricultural credit markets and insurance markets need to be developed together 
(Karlan et al., 2014) to deliver their intended impacts. 
This paper reports on two analyses using data from an ongoing randomized 
control trial (RCT) in Kenya of a novel financial product that links index insurance to 
microfinance loans with the aim of opening access to credit markets for households 
that have positive notional demand for credit, but no effective demand due to aversion 
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to the risk of collateral loss. The first analysis is on the determinants of a household’s 
credit rationing status. Credit rationing refers to a household either not having access 
to credit markets due to supply-side constraints, or choosing not to access credit 
markets due to non-price terms of the loans. The second analysis looks at loan uptake 
across the various credit rationing groups and the different credit products offered 
during the RCT.  
Until recently, most literature on credit rationing in rural agricultural markets 
has been limited to the examination of supply-side constraints, called quantity 
rationing, (Bell et al., 1997; Carter, 1988; Carter and Olinto, 2003; Hillier and 
Ibrahimo, 1993; Jaffee and Stiglitz, 1990; Kochar, 1997; Barry et al., 1981), whereby 
a household faces a credit market that is constrained and have their loan application 
rejected, or failed to apply due to belief that they would be rejected. Barry et al. (1981) 
define credit risks as “unanticipated variations in the costs and availability of credit 
that arise from forces in financial markets or from lenders’ responses to risks in 
agricultural markets and farmers’ creditworthiness.” This stops short of considering 
consumers’ response to both environmental factors (environmental here meaning both 
the actual environment and the economic environment) and the non-price terms of 
loan contracts. 
However, increasingly there is evidence of other types of rationing affecting 
participation in the credit markets (Boucher and Carter, 2001; Boucher et al., 2008, 
2009; Guirkinger and Boucher, 2008; Verteramo Chiu et al., 2014).  Unlike the 
households that are denied access to the credit market, and therefore quantity rationed, 
some may voluntarily withdraw due to the non-price terms of contracts available to 
them such as the required transaction costs (e.g. time, if bank is far away), or collateral 
requirements (e.g. having to put up land title) (Boucher et al., 2009; Guirkinger and 
Boucher, 2008). Risk rationing and transaction-cost rationing arise when the limiting 
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constraint comes from the demand side, and these types of credit constraints are 
especially important to understand because the policy strategy for their alleviation 
differs from a strategy designed to eliminate quantity rationing (Boucher et al., 2009; 
Karlan et al., 2014).  
One novel strategy to remove the constraints of risk-rationed farmers is called 
risk contingent credit. While similar structures have been developed and discussed 
(Giné and Yang, 2009; Karlan et al., 2011; Miranda and Gonzalez-Vega, 2011; Skees 
and Barry J. Barnett, 2006), risk contingent credit (RCC), as developed by Shee and 
Turvey (2012) is “a general term we use for any credit instrument that embeds within 
its structure a contingent claim which when triggered transfers part or all of the 
borrower’s liability to the lender or integrator/counterparty.” Such an instrument can 
theoretically substitute for collateral, opening access to the credit markets for those 
who have an investment opportunity with expected positive profit, but who voluntarily 
withdraw from the market due to the negative utility associated with risk of collateral 
loss. Liquidation of productive assets, such as real estate and livestock, can be 
especially damaging to a household’s future wellbeing (Carter and Barrett, 2006; 
Barry et al., 1981), and therefore it makes sense households may be especially risk-
averse to losing these assets. In the context of agricultural loans, productive assets are 
often the required collateral. Risk contingent credit, therefore, removes the constraints 
stopping a risk rationed household from utilizing the credit market to enhance 
productivity and well-being, while providing a safety net should an outside event 
threaten productivity and well-being. This product is especially promising because it is 
unlikely that credit and insurance markets can develop effectively on their own in 
developing countries with little agriculture financial infrastructure in place (Carter et 
al., 2011; Karlan et al., 2014).  
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In the product this study focuses on, the contingent claim is based on an index, 
not an assessment of actual losses. There are both benefits and challenges associated 
with index, or parametric, insurance relative to more traditional indemnity-based 
insurance. Some of the problems index insurance helps alleviate include moral hazard, 
adverse selection, and high administration costs (Miranda and Gonzalez-Vega, 2011). 
The combination of these factors make index insurance much less expensive, and 
therefore accessible, than traditional insurance products for poor households. The 
main detraction of index insurance is the introduction of basis risk, which is the 
potential variation and mismatch between index measurements and actual losses (Marr 
et al., 2016). Therefore, it is important to have a trustworthy index which is highly 
correlated to agricultural losses. In the context of agricultural production in Kenya, 
where drought is the greatest source of covariate risk and which has seen an increasing 
number of weather shocks recently (Funk et al., 2010), the most popular index is local 
cumulative rainfall.  
In order to fully understand the implications of an expanded understanding of 
credit rationing that includes both supply and demand-side constraints, the potential of 
RCC and to place the results of the reported analyses in context, we will now present a 
brief background on Kenya’s agricultural economy and credit access. 
Kenya’s geography consists mostly of arid lands (70%), with semi-arid lands 
accounting for an addition 19% of the land surface. That leaves 11% of land in a 
“high-potential” category and 62% of the country’s population lives on this 11% of 
land (Oluoch-Kosura, 2016). In 2016, agriculture accounted for 36% of Kenya’s GDP, 
while accounting for 61.1% of total employment (World Bank, 2018; Oluoch-Kosura, 
2016). Food accounts for 52.9% of the country’s exports. However, 80% of farmers 
are categorized as subsistence farmers and do not contribute any production into local, 
regional, or national markets (World Bank, 2013). On top of the production, market, 
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and institutional challenges that Kenya faces in its agricultural development journey, 
the country has seen an increasing number of weather shocks, such as drought, that 
impact smallholder farmer’s vulnerability (Oluoch-Kosura, 2016; Funk et al., 2010).  
Importantly for Kenya’s overall economic growth strategy, there is a tight correlation 
between the country’s GDP growth rate and the growth rate of the agricultural sector 
(Oluoch-Kosura, 2016). The agricultural sector’s growth is inhibited by smallholder 
credit rationing and lack of easily accessible risk management strategies, such as 
insurance.   
Now we turn to credit access and usage in Kenya. In 2016, an estimated 34% 
of the country’s population had an open loan. However, only 15.6% of those were 
from formal sources with the remaining coming from informal sources such as social 
networks and community groups (FSD Kenya, 2016). Nasr (2017) found that Kenyans 
rely heavily on these informal loans and that the formal credit market does not 
increase the usage of other services, such as technical assistance or extension services. 
This raises a question as to the reasoning behind the lack of usage of formal credit. Is 
informal credit preferred to formal credit? If so, then introducing new formal credit 
products may not be the most effective route to increased wellbeing and decreased 
vulnerability of the targeted population. This does not appear to be the case because 
there is strong evidence pointing to pent-up demand for formal credit (Nasr, 2017). 
The results of the uptake analysis reported in this paper corroborate that evidence as 
well.  
Narrowing the scope, the study that informed the analyses reported in this 
paper was conducted in the Machakos county in Kenya. Machakos has hilly terrain, a 
semi-arid climate, is located in the southwestern region of Kenya, and borders 
Kenya’s largest city and capital of Nairobi (Figure 1). Maize is the main food crop 
produced by smallholder farmers in the county. The survey population consists of a 
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subset of 1,170 agricultural households. In order to maximize the generalizability of 
the results and increase variation in the survey population, the sample was selected 
from 13 locations dispersed among five sub-counties of Machakos. Within each 
location, there were six villages randomly selected and 15 households of each village 
were then randomly selected to fill out the sample size (Table 1). 
 
Figure 1: Map of Kenya with Machakos County highlighted. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: Breakdown of households in survey 
among the sub-counties and locations. 
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On average, the households surveyed were headed by individuals who were 
56.2 years old who had completed 8.6 years of formal schooling. 21% of households 
were headed by a female. The average household had 5.7 members where 30.2% of 
members’ primary activity was crop production. The only higher primary activity was 
schooling, with 36.8% of survey population being students (Figure 2). Within the 
survey sample, households on average tended to four acres spread over two plots. 
Ownership of land was very high, with 94% of plots farmed being owned by the 
household that was tending to the plot. Table 2 shows the mean and standard 
deviations across the rationing groups of the socioeconomic and production variables 
used in the analysis of determinants of credit rationing status.  
 
 
Figure 2: 
Breakdown of 
household members 
primary activity. 
 
 
 
 
 
Since the goal of RCC is to open access to credit markets for the credit 
rationed, it is important to understand the ration status of any population where the 
instrument is introduced. The background survey that informs the first analysis 
presented below not only included questions on socioeconomic and production 
characteristics of the households, but also included a section that utilized a direct 
elicitation method to categorize households between the four types of ration status, 
price, quantity, risk, and transaction cost rationed.  
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It is obvious that including demand-side rationing (risk and transaction cost 
rationed) is important for policy and or market solutions to increasing smallholder 
wellbeing as they make up 43.3% of the survey sample (Figure 3). It’s easy to imagine 
that underestimating the credit constraint status of a population by 43% would lead to 
inefficient and non-optimal policies. 
Table 2: Breakdown of mean and standard deviation of variables used in analysis by rationing status 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: 
Breakdown of 
household’s 
ration status for 
those 
participating in 
survey and RCT. 
16 
The rest of the paper is as follows. Chapter two reviews the relevant literature 
needed to understand the reasoning for, mechanics of, and applications of risk 
contingent credit, with details on credit constraints/rationing, index insurance, a 
review of structures similar to RCC, and a review of studies that also utilized a DEM 
to understand credit rationing. Chapter three describes the methods including a 
description of the SATISFy project this analysis is part of, details and logistics of the 
RCT, the direct elicitation methodology used to collect the data, and the empirical 
strategy of each analysis. Chapter four reports the results of the analyses. Chapter five 
is a discussion of results and implications for the growing number of organizations and 
enterprises focusing on increasing financial inclusion among those at the base of the 
economic pyramid. Chapter six concludes. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Credit Constraints and Rationing 
In this section, we will seek to understand the concepts of credit constraints 
and rationing broadly, and then dive into an explanation of each of the four credit 
rationing groups. The terms credit constraints and credit rationing inherently suggests 
that these phenomena negatively impact households. Indeed, it has been empirically 
shown that credit constraints have negative effects across both production and 
livelihood choices of smallholder farmers. In one study, the choices that credit 
constraints negatively impact included food consumption, input applications, health, 
and education (Kumar et al., 2013). Another study finds that credit constraints lower 
the value of agricultural production in a region by 26% (Guirkinger and Boucher, 
2008). That same study showed that agricultural productivity was tightly linked with a 
household’s endowment if they were credit constrained, but was independent of a 
household’s endowment if they were not credit constrained. This is further evidence 
that credit constraints impact production choices. When a household’s credit is 
constrained in the formal markets, there is a chance that they will spill-over into 
unregulated, informal markets in search of credit (Bell et al., 1997; Boucher and 
Guirkinger, 2007). The informal market could be made up of friendly lenders, such as 
family, friends, and neighbors, or predatory lenders. However, Boucher and 
Guirkinger (2007) show that the informal sector loans may be better equipped to 
smooth consumer consumption due to lower collateral requirements. This suggests 
that in some scenarios unconstrained households may choose to borrow from the 
informal sector due to lower collateral requirements.  
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It was determined in the 1980’s that liberalization of credit markets would not 
be enough to provide equitable access to credit markets for smallholder farmers as 
adverse selection could cause banks to endogenously impose restrictions that ration 
farmers out of the market (Carter, 1988). Jaffee and Stiglitz (1990) give an early, 
detailed treatment of credit rationing and provide four definitions of different types of 
credit rationing. However, the constraints all come from the (lack of) supply of credit. 
In Jaffee and Stiglitz’s typology the four definitions of credit rationing were as 
follows. Interest rate (price) rationing is the same as in our typology where a borrow 
makes a trade-off between size of loan and interest rate. Redlining is similar to our 
typology of quantity rationing whereby a lender will not borrow to a potential 
borrower at any interest rate. Pure credit rationing describes situations where 
apparently identical individuals who are willing to borrow are offered loans with the 
same terms however some are able to borrow and others are not. In the situation of 
pure credit rationing, changes to the availability of credit will be more beneficial than 
changes in the interest rates. Of Jaffee and Stiglitz’s typology, divergent views 
rationing is the closest to addressing demand-side constraints. In divergent views 
rationing, some potential borrowers feel their interest rates are not reflective of their 
true probability of default and choose not to borrow on those terms (Jaffee and 
Stiglitz, 1990). It is important to note that Jaffee and Stiglitz were focused on the US 
for their analysis and that a lack of financial literacy would potentially prevent 
smallholder farmers from making the judgement call in divergent view rationing. One 
advantage of the DEM survey method described below and utilized in this study is that 
it allows for us to understand the thoughts behind action or non-action in the credit 
market and not only the household’s actions. 
What causes credit constraints and rationing to arise? First, it is important to 
understand that credit markets are different from standard markets for goods. Credit 
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markets rely on a promise of repayment instead of payment on the spot for a good. 
The temporal element of credit adds uncertainty to the probability of repayment and in 
credit contracts the interest rate represents what the borrower promises to repay, not 
what they will actually repay (Jaffee and Stiglitz, 1990). This leads to credit contracts 
that are multidimensional, not purely reliant on the interest rate to secure the lender’s 
income (e.g. enforcement and collateral collection agreements in the credit contracts).  
The uncertainty in credit repayment is not the only issue leading to a potential 
for credit rationing. In a model world that is perfectly competitive, where information 
is symmetrically distributed, and enforcement is costless, credit contracts could be 
written conditional on borrower behavior (Boucher and Carter, 2001). We do not live 
in this model world though, and asymmetric information and positive enforcement 
costs have the potential to lead to adverse selection and moral hazard problems which 
restricts the set of available contracts (Boucher and Carter, 2001; Hillier and Ibrahimo, 
1993; Jaffee and Stiglitz, 1990). Information asymmetries can lead to adverse 
selection whereby households with higher than average risk of default opt into credit, 
while those with less than average risk opt out, this increases the cost of credit across a 
lenders portfolio. Moral hazard refers to the possibility that there is a lack of 
repayment incentive due to unlikelihood of collateral collection or other consequence 
being felt by the household.  
That this restriction adversely effects the households we label as quantity 
rationed has been well covered by the literature, with the discussion of rationing 
focusing on supply-side constraints and policies to reduce the frequency of quantity 
rationing. This is done mainly via land titling programs with the idea that the 
households will then be able to borrow against their titles, however titling has been 
found to only increase credit supply for a subset of wealthier households (Carter and 
Olinto, 2003). Additionally, Boucher et al (2008) find that titling may reduce quantity 
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rationing but with the tradeoff of increasing risk rationing. However, demand-side 
constraints also reduce credit market participation so we need to understand both 
supply and demand-side constraints in order to develop optimal policies for rural 
agricultural finance.   
Now we define the various ration statuses, starting with the more traditional 
price and quantity rationed and finishing with more recently explored demand-side 
constraints of the transaction cost and risk rationed. We will dwell longer on the 
theoretical understanding of risk rationing as RCC is specifically designed to alleviate 
this constraint. 
 Price rationed, or unconstrained households can be either borrowers, who are 
satisfied with the loan amount at the price offered (this is referred to as external price 
rationing), or non-borrowers, who voluntarily chose not to enter credit markets even 
when faced with fair market prices and transaction costs (internal price rationing) 
(Verteramo Chiu et al., 2014). In general, households that are price rationed are those 
that interact with the credit market in the expected way, entering the market to finance 
a profitable investment project that they do not have the liquidity to self-finance. In 
this context, price rationing is determined by cost-quantity tradeoffs along the demand 
curve, where Verteramo Chiu et al. (2014) show individual credit demand elasticities 
affect the degree by which such tradeoffs take place. 
 The other three categories of credit rationing, the non-price rationed 
households, are those that would like to borrow money at the going interest rate but 
could not qualify for the loan, are not willing to pay transaction costs on the loan, or 
are afraid to lose collateral (Boucher et al., 2008). As already touched on in the 
introduction, quantity rationed households are those that are supply-side constrained. 
These households have had a loan application rejected, been offered a loan of an 
amount less than they applied for, or have not applied for a loan due to the belief that 
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they would be rejected. Quantity rationed households face binding credit limits and 
therefore should be expected to have excess credit demand (Verteramo Chiu et al., 
2014). More technically, in the presence of asymmetric information a lender will 
restrict the set of interest rate/collateral pairings they are willing to trade between, 
setting some minimum sufficiently high collateral (Boucher et al., 2009). This 
restriction of feasible contract sets means that a household has a profitable project, and 
therefore positive notional demand for credit, but faces zero credit supply. This 
mechanism is what gives rise to quantity rationing due to supply-side constraints.  
 Within this framework for understanding credit rationing status, there will also 
be households that face constraints on the demand side, which limit market 
participation. These households will have positive notional demand and face positive 
supply but may not show any effective demand. Effective demand is the demand for 
contracts available in the real world of asymmetric information, those contracts that 
are within the restricted available contract space (Boucher et al., 2009).  Both 
households that are supply side (quantity) rationed and demand side (risk and 
transaction cost) rationed would be able to undertake projects with expected positive 
returns in the first best world of symmetric information. However, in the real world of 
imperfect and asymmetrical information, both groups undertake low return, safe labor 
activity (Boucher and Carter, 2001). 
The last two types of credit rationing status define those who have a positive 
notional demand but may not have positive effective demand. There have been several 
studies that that have pointed this out (Boucher et al., 2008, 2009; Jappelli, 1990; 
Mushinski, 1999); because of the restriction of possible contracts due to asymmetric 
information, a household may have both positive notional demand and face positive 
supply but has no effective demand for available contracts. A key driver that will lead 
a household to have no effective demand for credit even when they have positive 
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notional demand and positive supply is the inclusion of collateral requirements in the 
credit contracts. This shifts the risk profile of contracts and increases transaction costs.  
Transaction-cost rationed describes those households that face zero effective demand 
due to the size of the transaction costs associated with the loan, such as distance/time 
to local bank branch, amount of paperwork required, and self-evaluation of the 
opportunity cost of pursuing a credit contract.  
The concepts that underpin risk rationing have a long history, and they point to 
the theoretical advantages of risk contingent credit. Many studies have found that 
farmers are willing to pay a premium in order to avoid the potential for collateral loss 
(Binswanger, 1980; Binswanger and Sillers, 1983; Carter, 1988; Eswaran and Kotwal, 
1990). In an early precursor to the risk rationing concept, Binswanger and Sillers 
(1983) suggest that farmers may withdraw from credit markets even if they are eligible 
for their desired loan if they are faced with uninsured contractual risk.  
Risk rationed describes the households that show lower effective demand due 
to the risk-sharing rules of the contract, usually dealing with collection of collateral in 
the event of default (Verteramo Chiu et al., 2014). Boucher et. al. (2008) define risk 
rationing as occurring “when insurance markets are absent, and lenders, constrained 
by asymmetric information, shift so much contractual risk to the borrower that the 
borrower voluntarily withdraws from the credit market even when she has the 
collateral wealth needed to qualify for a loan contract.” This increase in contractual 
risk acts in a similar manner to an increase in interest rate to equilibrate the credit 
market by reducing demand. However, credit markets are infrequently in equilibria as 
there is often excess demand for credit (Jaffee and Stiglitz, 1990).  
The collateral requirement forces the household to bear a minimum amount of 
risk and the inclusion of this risk in their expected utility calculation drives the 
borrower’s expected utility below their reservation utility, even though the loan would 
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raise expected consumption (Boucher et al., 2009). This last point, the difference 
between expected utility and expected consumption is critical to understanding the 
plight of the risk rationed.  
It is worth noting insights from prospect theory here. Most households are risk 
averse, and they are making decisions under uncertainty. They will make judgements 
about accepting credit based on the relative gains and losses associated with their 
choices and not on their potential absolute wealth level that results from their choice. 
If we accept prospect theory, their value functions will be steeper for losses than for 
gains (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). This explains why their expected utility can be 
lower if they accept an economically fair credit contract that includes the potential for 
collateral loss. They weigh this loss more than the potential upside from their increase 
in expected consumption and therefore reject the credit contract.  
The analysis of credit constraints and credit rationing has a long history. Until 
recently though, the impact of demand-side constraints and rationing has not received 
as much attention in the literature, and therefore, there are not as many policy 
interventions focused on relieving these constraints. This has been changing, and we 
now have a better understanding of the mechanisms that underlie risk and transaction 
cost rationing. Risk contingent credit is one novel intervention designed to open credit 
markets to the risk rationed. It’s potential relies on an embedded contingent claim, an 
index insurance contract. We will now explore the literature around index insurance in 
more depth. 
Index Insurance 
There has been a growing interest in the application of index insurance to 
alleviate pressures on the rural, agrarian poor in developing countries and there is a 
lively debate about the optimal use of the emerging tool in this context (Tadesse et al., 
2015; Turvey, 2011). The inclusion of an embedded index insurance claim is one of 
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the innovative features of risk contingent credit, and as such is it important to 
understand what exactly index insurance is, its benefits and challenges, and generally 
the literature concerning its usage in development contexts. We will review these areas 
over the following pages.  
 Insurance allows agricultural households to make an ex ante investment to 
smooth income/consumption in the event they experience a negative shock (Skees and 
Barnett, 2006). Index insurance is different than classic insurance schemes in that 
potential pay outs are not tied to an evaluation of actual losses at the household level, 
rather they are tied to the outcome of an index over a predetermined period of time 
relative to a specific trigger on the index. Index insurance is designed to handle 
covariate risks that will effect a large geographic area or population. Unlike 
idiosyncratic risks that may arise out of farmer practices such as input use and land 
stewardship, covariate risks will likely effect an entire village or county.  As such, 
there are different determinants of demand for index insurance relative to traditional 
insurance (Marr et al., 2016). On the one hand, index insurance is cheaper and easier 
to deliver to areas that have previously been thought of as uninsurable but on the other 
hand index insurance has greater uncertainty and variation between actual losses and 
the index trigger. This opens the door for basis risk. The term basis risk is used to 
describe the lack of perfect correlation of actual losses and a calculated index and is 
one of the main challenges faced by index insurance programs to date (Tadesse et al., 
2015). 
 As basis risk is such an important issue for implementing index insurance 
programs, the selection of an appropriate index is incredibly important. Ideally, an 
index should be a random variable that is based on timely, objective, transparent, 
measurable, and independently verifiable data that is experienced over a (relatively) 
large geography, highly correlated with losses, and cannot be influenced by any 
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actions of the insured (Alderman and Haque, 2007; Miranda and Gonzalez-Vega, 
2011). Some indices that have been employed to date include total rainfall, 
temperature, area-yield index, vegetation indices, regional livestock mortality rates, 
and El-Nino indices (Greatrex et al., 2015; Miranda and Gonzalez-Vega, 2011; 
Tadesse et al., 2015). While these indices are all posited to have a causal relationship 
with potential losses, it is worthwhile to note that an index’s relationship to losses 
need not be causal, rather the important feature is the statistical correlation between 
the index and losses. However, weather-related risks are instrumental in determining 
livelihood outcomes for smallholder farmers and as such most indices suggested to 
date are focused on weather events or the outcomes of weather events (Alderman and 
Haque, 2007).  
Many indices that have been utilized to date that have struggled with basis risk 
are simple rainfall triggers (Gommes and Göbel, 2013). They are often used because 
of their simplicity and transparency, which are highly desired features of insurance 
contracts, especially for households with limited financial literacy. However, there has 
been increasing interest in more complex (but more accurate across both yield and 
spatial considerations) indices that take into account more data than cumulative 
rainfall (Gommes and Göbel, 2013; Muneepeerakul et al., 2017). In the final 
discussion of this paper, we will dwell on the consideration of more complex indices 
as the RCT associated with this study ran into basis risk issues using a cumulative 
rainfall trigger without accounting for frequency and intensity of the rain.  
 Why is there so much excitement around index insurance’s application toward 
solving wicked development challenges? One reason is that the technologies to 
efficiently calculate trustworthy indices are becoming more readily available and 
better understood/trusted. Such technologies include satellite imaging, remote sensing, 
and IoT (Internet of Things). While the technology is the key enabler of index 
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insurance, its ability to avoid/nullify key constraints that have hampered credit and 
insurance in rural markets are the truly exciting features. Index insurance’s advantages 
include its low administrative costs (insurers do not have to collect household level 
data on losses), the elimination of moral hazard (the insured cannot influence index 
value), and being free of adverse selection issues (contract and premium based on 
publicly available data) (Marr et al., 2016; Miranda and Gonzalez-Vega, 2011). By 
eliminating these potential constraints to insurance delivery, it is hoped that 
households will move away from reservation, low yield/risk strategies and toward 
riskier strategies that have the potential to raise productivity, income, and consumption 
when they are protected against downside losses via an ex ante insurance investment.  
 As hinted to a few times in this section so far, for all of their potential, index 
insurance schemes also have faced significant challenges in development contexts 
(Tadesse et al., 2015).  On the institutional side, insurers may struggle to pool 
covariate risks into portfolios because, by definition, covariate risks are highly 
correlated and the less correlated risks in an insurance portfolio are, the lower its 
overall variance. This can be handled by transferring the risk through reinsurance into 
secondary markets, however, reinsurers may struggle to audit contracts, leading to 
loading charges and higher premiums (Alderman and Haque, 2007). Additionally, 
Alderman and Haque (2007) bring attention to the fact that risks are hard to quantify 
in changing climatic, political, and economic environments and historical data may not 
provide true guidance for development of appropriate indices and triggers.  
The largest challenge of index insurance though is undoubtedly the creation of 
basis risk. There are two types of basis risk, production and geographic basis risk. 
Production basis risk refers to the probability that indices and their triggers are not 
tightly correlated to damages. Geographic basis risk refers to the probability that the 
index being tracked is different between the insured’s location and the data collection 
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location, which are usually rain gauges (Muneepeerakul et al., 2017). In an attempt to 
make indices easy and transparent, index insurance schemes may increase basis risk, 
particularly production basis risk because cumulative rainfall (a common index used) 
does not account for the important impact that rainfall frequency and intensity have on 
yield outcomes (Gommes and Göbel, 2013). As an example, in our study in the 
Machakos region of Kenya there were significant damages, but the cumulative rainfall 
was above the insurance trigger because the rain fell infrequently but in large 
quantities when it did.  
 This is a huge issue for the potential growth of index insurance as a risk 
mitigation strategy for farmers in developing countries. When farmers are introduced 
to the product, it is assumed that in the event of drought, or other negative event the 
insurance is linked to, they will receive their payout. In the event that they experience 
losses and are not compensated it is likely they will lose trust in the insurance product, 
and potential financial markets more broadly. In a series of experiments in Ghana, 
Karlan et. al (2014) found that demand for insurance in subsequent years after first 
launch was positively associated with farmers and their neighbors receiving payouts.  
 There have been multiple studies completed looking into the use of index 
insurance for agrarian households in developing countries beyond the Karlan et. al 
(2014) paper. We will now review a few key findings of these studies before moving 
on to the next section of the literature review. First, in the Karlan et. al (2014) study 
they found high demand for index insurance, and that those households who accepted 
insurance did indeed invest significantly larger amounts into their agricultural 
operations and made riskier production choices. Secondly, Marr et. al (2016) 
conducted a systematic review of the literature around the adoption and impact of 
index insurance and credit for smallholder farmers. They found that stated demand for 
index insurance could be very substantial, with up to 90% of some study participants 
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wanting to pay for insurance. However, they found that actual demand was much 
lower, ranging from 2%-50% and the majority of studies indicating uptake of less than 
25%. Third, as has been mentioned multiple times so far, there is evidence that neither 
the insurance market nor the credit market for agricultural households in developing 
countries are likely to develop on their own (Carter et al., 2011; Karlan et al., 2014; 
Tadesse et al., 2015). These findings are one of the reasons for the recent proliferation 
of studies looking at the potential for linked insurance-credit products, such as risk 
contingent credit, to help alleviate the struggles of the targeted populations.  
Finally, it is worth pointing out that most of these studies on index insurance to 
date have focused on marketing the insurance at the household level. One paper 
looked at marketing insurance at a higher level on the financial value chain, targeting 
banks than make microloans to agricultural households because the bank’s basis risk is 
lower (Farrin and Miranda, 2015). They find that giving the banks first claim on 
payouts can reduce interest rates and therefore increase access to credit. The optimal 
point for insurance along the MFI value chain is an area that deserves more analysis in 
the literature.  
The interest in utilizing index insurance to increase the livelihood outcomes of 
agricultural, poor households in developing countries is deserved. However, the 
indices used to trigger payouts need to be carefully considered and potentially made 
more complex to reduce basis risk and insurance markets should be developed in 
unison with credit markets, if not marketed together in bundled products, in order the 
maximize index insurance’s impacts. 
Review of Similar Structures 
As mentioned in the previous section, there has been a recognition for a few 
decades that some farmers may withdraw from credit markets even though they are 
eligible for a loan in the face of uninsured contractual risk (Binswanger and Sillers, 
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1983). Prior to the exploration of products that bundle index insurance and credit that 
has mainly happened over the last decade, there were earlier efforts to lower the risk 
of agricultural loans. We will quickly review these, namely commodity-linked 
instruments, before going over studies that report on more recent experiments on 
bundled products.  
 A very early predecessor to insurance linked credit products is the commodity 
bond. Commodity bonds are different from traditional bonds because instead of 
paying nominal interest rates and repaying principle along a determined schedule, the 
commodity bond pays off in stated quantities of a commodity (e.g. gold, cotton) 
(O’Hara, 1984). It was proposed that commodity bonds were valuable because they 
provide a form of insurance. However, O’Hara (1984) showed that while they do 
protect against relative price changes, the mechanism introduces greater variability 
into future real income streams thereby reducing the viability of the bonds to provide 
price insurance for future consumption.  
 An evolution of the commodity bond is the commodity-linked loan. These 
loans have a payoff structure that includes an embedded option rider on the underlying 
commodity and therefore allows the loan repayment structure to be contingent on the 
price of the commodity (Jin and Turvey, 2002; Turvey, 2006). These loans can be 
used to hedge financial risks that arise when a firm faces unfavorable business risk, 
however the studies around them focus on developed markets, and it is not clear that 
they could be used in a microcredit context effectively, particularly in developing 
countries that do not have robust financial and commodity markets.  
 When we consider products specifically intended to increase the welfare of 
agricultural households in developing countries it has become clear that insurance 
markets and credit markets are unlikely to develop separately and therefore, bundled 
or linked insurance and credit products may be most effective in opening access to 
30 
financial markets for the targeted populations (Carter et al., 2011; Karlan et al., 2014; 
Marr et al., 2016). While little empirical research has been conducted on these bundled 
products (Marr et al., 2016), there have been two field studies of bundled products 
targeting farmers in developing countries we will now review. Before that though, it’s 
worth noting we are focusing on crop farmers, not livestock herding/ranching. There 
have been studies that look at index based livestock insurance in Kenya, Ethiopia and 
Mongolia, but we do not report on those studies here (Chantarat et al., 2009; Greatrex 
et al., 2015).  
 First, we review a randomized experiment on price-indexed insurance-linked 
loans that was run in Ghana. In the experimental group, farmers were offered loans 
with an embedded indemnity component that would forgive 50% of a loan should crop 
prices drop below a trigger price while the control group were offered normal loans at 
the same interest rate (Karlan et al., 2011). This means that the insurance component 
was fully subsidized in this experiment. An interesting feature of their experiment is 
that they worked through existing banking infrastructure and farmers did not know 
that they were taking part in a natural field experiment. Therefore, those who 
participated in the study had self-selected into it by showing interest in taking out a 
loan. The study found very high take up across both treatments, 86% for the control 
product and 92% for the treatment product and that the indemnity had little impact on 
other outcomes of interest as well (Karlan et al., 2011). This suggests that the study 
population may have had highly inelastic demand for credit and were willing to accept 
a credit offer no matter the price or additional features (embedded price insurance). 
However, the fact that farmers self-selected into the experiment by showing up at a 
bank to ask for a loan may have biased the results. 
 Second, we report on a randomized field experiment conducted in Malawi in 
2006 that sought to understand if the provision of insurance would induce farmers to 
31 
take out loans to adopt risky crop technology (Giné and Yang, 2009). In their 
experiment, around 800 maize and groundnut farmers were split into two groups, one 
which was offered credit for new hybrid high-yield seeds and one which was offered a 
similar credit package but also had to purchase a rainfall index insurance policy at 
actuarially fair rates that forgave the loan partially or fully depending on the 
cumulative rainfall outcome in growing season. Interestingly, in this experiment take 
up of the bundled product was 20% while take up of the uninsured credit product was 
33% (Giné and Yang, 2009). They suggest that this result may be due to farmers 
already having implicit insurance in the form of the limited liability clause of loan 
contract and point out that uptake of the bundled product is positively correlated with 
education, income and wealth while this is not the case for uptake among those offered 
the standard credit product.  
 The results of these two field studies corroborate the initial findings of the 
RCT reported in this paper and suggest that while it is recognized that insurance and 
credit markets should be developed in unison, this is not a straight forward task and 
the desired effects of bundled insurance and credit products, mainly increased welfare 
of farmers, does not follow linearly from introducing a bundled product to a market. 
We will now move on to a review of the two studies that look into the determinants of 
ration status that include an examination of the risk rationed.  
Review of Determinants of Risk Rationing Literature 
To date, there have been two other studies that have utilized a direct elicitation 
method (DEM) in order to look into the determinants of a household’s credit rationing 
status with a particular interest in the risk rationed (Boucher et al., 2009; Verteramo 
Chiu et al., 2014). These papers looked study populations in Peru, Mexico and China.  
Boucher et al. (2009) comment that the limited amount of empirical study of credit 
constraints can be attributed, at least partly, to the challenges of econometrically 
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identifying the impacts of credit constraints on households. However, they follow in 
the footsteps of Carter and Olinto (2003) and Jappelli (1990) in implementing the 
survey technique we are calling DEM. We will discuss DEM in greater detail in the 
methodology chapter, but it is important to note that these papers did use the same 
technique as we do to classify and partition the survey populations into their rationing 
groups. This increases the generalizability of the results.  
We will first review Boucher et al. (2009) who studied the determinants of 
credit rationing in Peru and also tested the validity of using DEM in this line of 
research into risk rationing. To get the question of DEM validity out of the way, they 
do find that the method does allow for researchers to distinguish those households 
whose credit demands are most affected by risk. Before getting to the analysis of 
determinants of credit rationing status conducted in this study, another important 
analysis they conducted was an impact evaluation with and without the inclusion of 
the demand-side constraint categories. They found that inclusion of transaction cost 
and risk rationing lead to a doubling of the impact measure.  
The analysis of the determinants of credit rationing status was conducted 
utilizing a multinomial logit and they report the marginal impacts of regression 
variables across five categories: price rationed borrowers, price rationed non-
borrowers, transaction cost rationed, risk rationed, and quantity rationed. The variables  
used included: wealth, available labor, educational achievement, farm size, proportion 
of farmed land household held the title to, distance to nearest formal lender, a dummy 
to measure whether or not respondent could identify the minister of economics 
(“informed”=1) , variance of yields in district, a risk aversion measure and maximum 
level of informal credit available to household. Of particular interest were the 
following results.  
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• Unsurprising, the more wealth a household has the more likely they are 
to be price rationed. Wealth did not have an affect across the other 
rationing groups. 
• Having a higher proportion of farm land titled led respondents being 
significantly less likely to be quantity rationed, transaction cost 
rationed, and price rationed non-borrowers and significantly more 
likely to be a price rationed borrower at the 5% level.   
• The larger amount of family labor available to the household, the more 
likely they were to be transaction cost rationed while that was not 
significant across other groups. 
• The farther from the nearest source of formal credit a household was, 
the less likely they were to be price rationed and the more likely to be 
risk and quantity rationed.  
• The greater the yield variation around a household, the more likely they 
were to be either risk or quantity rationed.  
• The greater the level of risk aversion, the less likely a household was to 
be a price rationed non-borrower and the more likely they were to be 
either risk or quantity rationed.  
 Moving on to the second paper that uses the DEM to analyze credit rationing 
status we will now discuss the results of Verteramo Chiu et al. (2014) who reported on 
studies conducted in both Mexico and China. They break rationing status into three 
groups: price rationed, quantity rationed, and risk rationed. Beyond analyzing the 
determinants of rationing status across socioeconomic and production variables, they 
also analyzed the effect of the elasticity of demand for credit across rationing status 
and found that that it does indeed differ across these rationing groups. They run 
multinomial logit, as well as individual bivariate logit and OLS models and they all 
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tell a similar story. Therefore, they report on the OLS results for ease of interpretation.  
As their regression analysis included variables for the varying levels of elasticity of 
demand, we will focus our attention here to only the socioeconomic and production 
variables included in their regression analyses. These include: sex, education, years of 
farming, farm size, income, percent of income from farming, asset value, savings, 
informal borrowing, formal borrowing, credit worthiness, entrepreneurship variables, 
prudence, and risk aversion. The following results are of particular interest: 
• There are differences between the significance of the variables across 
the rationing groups in Mexico vs. in China, hitting home the 
importance of understanding the local conditions (culture, environment, 
economics, etc.).  
• There was limited significance in the socioeconomic variables, 
however the formal and informal borrowing variables did correlate to 
the varying rationing statuses as theory would predict in China.  
• The larger the household’s asset value, the less likely they were to be 
quantity rationed and more likely they were to be price rationed in 
China, and the less likely they would be risk rationed in Mexico.  
• The higher the risk aversion score, the more likely a household was to 
be risk rationed and less likely a household was to be quantity rationed 
in China.  
Now, we will move on to a discussion of the methodologies used in the study reported 
on in this paper.   
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CHAPTER 3 
 
METHODOLOGY  
Context of SATISFy Project 
The data for this research was collected in conjunction with an International 
Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) funded randomized control trial (RCT) of risk 
contingent credit (RCC) in Machakos county in Eastern Kenya as a part of a project 
called Satellite Technologies Innovative and Smart Financing for Food Security 
(SASTIFy). Machakos has hilly terrain and a semi-arid climate where maize is the 
main food crop produced by smallholder farmers. SASTIFy is a partnership between 
IFPRI and Equity Bank and looks to evaluate the viability of risk contingent credit as a 
market-based, innovative risk management solution/safety net to improve farmer 
livelihoods and mitigate drought risk. The project covered the growing season from 
October 2017 to March 2018 with pre and post surveys bookending the RCT.  
The IFPRI study involves three main activities. First, a background survey of the 
1170 randomly selected households who were chosen to participate in the randomized 
control trial of RCC. This survey is what informs the analysis of the determinants of a 
household’s credit rationing status reported here. Secondly, the RCT is implemented 
whereby households were given access to normal credit, RCC at fair value, RCC with 
a 25%, 50%, or 75% subsidy, or be in the control group. 
Experimental Group Number of Households 
Normal Credit 350 
Fair Value RCC 350 
RCC with 25%, 50% or 75% subsidy 120, 40 each 
Control 350 
Table 3: Breakdown of the survey population into experimental groups 
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The initial uptake results from the RCT have been collected and will inform 
the uptake analysis discussed later. Finally, there will also be a post-experiment survey 
conducted to gauge household reactions to RCC and delve further into reasoning for 
the uptake results and likelihood of product success in the market.  
 In order to maximize generalizability of the results of the study and to increase 
variation in survey population, the random sample was selected from 13 locations 
dispersed among five sub-counties of Machakos. Within each location, six villages 
were randomly selected with 15 households participating from each village. Table 4 
shows the sub-counties and locations used in the study. The treatments are 
homogeneous across the locations with an equal amount of farmers receiving each 
treatment (control, normal credit, RCC, subsidized RCC).  
 
Sub-County Location Households surveyed 
Kangundo Kanzalu 90 
Kakuyuni 90 
Kathiani Mitaboni 90 
Kathiani 90 
Iveti 90 
Matungulu Kyanzavi 90 
Matungulu 90 
Tala 90 
Mwala Mbiuni 90 
Mwala 90 
Masii 90 
Yatta Matuu 90 
Kithimani 90 
Total 1170 
Table 4: Breakdown of households surveyed by sub-county and location 
The background survey was designed to capture two main categories of 
information. First, it collected information of socioeconomic variables on interest such 
as agricultural land and production data, demographic data, subjective welfare, and 
risk preferences. Secondly, it was designed to elicit the households’ credit rationing 
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status. This process is described in greater detail after the following account of the 
technical details of the RCT.  
Logistics and Details of the RCT 
The randomized control trial (RCT) was implemented by Equity Bank starting 
in September of 2017. We will go over some key features of the RCT here in order to 
help the reader understand the logistics and important details of implementation. At 
the beginning of the project, Equity Bank employees met with local leaders at the 
village level in order to build support for the program and to encourage farmers to 
attend information sessions on RCC and general financial literacy. Then, over a ten-
day period, training sessions with randomly selected farmers were conducted at each 
location. 
Since households were chosen at random, there was variability in farmer’s 
financial literacy and trainings were conducted in order to introduce farmers to 
banking and agricultural credit. After these general discussions, farmers were 
introduced to RCC and walked through the various details of the product, including 
the importance of insurance, level of premium,  covered risks, and the loan application 
process. RCC was explained to the farmers through a game that illustrated the 
mechanisms and benefits of RCC relative to traditional practices with no credit and 
high productivity practices with credit. Prior research had found that this method of 
community engagement effectively explains RCC (Shee et al., 2015). There was also 
training on Good Agricultural Practices (GAP) and assistance from Equity Bank in 
opening accounts for those farmers who did not previously have an account. 
One important characteristic of the loans the farmers were offered is their 
form. These loans were not distributed in cash in order to prevent non-agricultural 
usage. Rather, the loans were advanced to identified agro dealers’ accounts and 
farmers were notified they could pick up their inputs from the dealer as soon as 
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possible. A second important fact is that the farmers had to be credit worthy in order to 
be extended a loan. All applications were submitted to branch credit committees for 
appraisal and farmers with a history of default were disqualified. One note from the 
distribution of loans is that while it was made explicit what form the loans would take, 
some farmers still expected to get cash and dropped out of the experiment after 
realizing this was not feasible.  
One unfortunate hiccup in the RCT process is that project implementation was 
slightly delayed. Collection of repayment is on-going and we do not yet know 
repayment rates. We will discuss some potential changes in the future to RCC 
implementation in the discussion chapter. Now however, we move on to a discussion 
of the Direct Elicitation Method used to categorize farmers into credit rationing 
categories.  
Direct Elicitation Method 
 In order to classify households’ rationing status, a direct elicitation method 
(DEM) was used. This method has been modified and adapted from Boucher et al. 
(2009) and Verteramo Chiu et al. (2014) and is similar to the survey methods used for 
contingent valuation. The DEM is a series of questions based both on a household’s 
experience and perception of credit since we are looking to assess demand-side (risk 
and transaction cost) and supply-side (quantity) rationing and the unconstrained 
(price). The structure of the DEM used in this survey is shown in Figure 4 and 
described below. Importantly, this structure allows for the rationing status to be 
determined from the households’ self-reported information. The full questionnaire can 
be found in Appendix 1.  
 The DEM begins by dividing households into two groups, those that must 
formally request a loan and those that are offered unsolicited loans from local banks, 
cooperatives and grain buyers. If a household falls into this second group, they cannot 
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be quantity rationed as they have been offered credit. Respondents are then asked 
about the size of the loans offered, and if they accepted the full amount offered. In the 
case that the household accepts the full loan amount, they are classified as price 
rationed. If the household either did not accept the loan, or accepted less than the full 
amount of the loan, then they are asked a series of questions to determine the reason 
they did not accept the loan. If it is because they are afraid of losing collateral, then 
they are classified as risk rationed. If it is because the transaction costs are too high, 
then they are classified as transaction cost rationed.  
In the first group, those who must formally request a loan, the next question is 
whether or not they have applied for a loan in the last two years. If they have applied, 
but either received no offer or an offer for a loan less than the amount requested the 
household is classified as quantity rationed, since the constraint is coming from the 
supply side.  Households are categorized as price rationed if they either accepted the 
offered loan, or did not accept the offered loan due to risks associated with the 
contract. The remaining households are then categorized as risk or transaction cost 
rationed depending on their reasoning for not accepting the offered loan. The risk 
rationed cited fear of losing collateral while the transaction cost rationed cited high 
transaction costs. It’s relevant to point out here that the households may know the 
lender’s rules and applied for the qualifying amount. Finally, those that have not 
applied for credit in the last two years were sorted into their rationing categories based 
on their responses to questions on why they had not applied.  
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Figure 4: Schematic of the Direct Elicitation Method used to partition households into credit rationing 
categories. 
After categorization, four observations are dropped after failing to fall into any 
of the predetermined rationing status categories. Checking the breakdown of rationing 
categories, the importance of studying the risk rationed is clearly evident, with 38.4% 
of the survey population being risk rationed. 46.4% of the survey population was price 
Local banks, cooperatives 
or grain buyers offer me 
loan without me 
requesting a loan 
I must formally request a 
loan from local banks, 
cooperatives or gain 
buyers.  
1. On the most recent loan offer, 
approximately how much did your 
banks/cooperatives/grain buyers offer to 
lend you? 
2. How much of loan (Tzs) did you 
actually use? 
If Q2<Q1 If Q2 = Q1 
Price 
rationed 
3a) Why? Because you are 
afraid of losing collateral? 
3b) Why? Because you are 
afraid of high transaction 
cost? 
Risk 
rationed 
Price 
rationed 
Yes No 
True 
Mutually exclusive 
rationed 
4. Have you applied for a loan from 
local banks, cooperatives or grain 
buyers within past two years?    
5. On the most recent loan 
request, how much loan in 
Tzs did you request? 
6. How much did bank/ 
cooperative /grain buyer 
offer to you? 
9a) Why? Because you 
are afraid of losing 
collateral? 
9b) Why? Because you 
are afraid of high 
transaction cost? 
Risk 
rationed 
Price 
rationed 
  Yes No 
No 
Quantity 
rationed 
7. (If answer to Q6 is 
greater than zero) Did 
you accept the offered 
loan?  
If Q6 = 0 or Q6<Q5 
Quantity rationed 
Price 
rationed 
Yes No 
8 Why? Because you are 
afraid of losing collateral? 
cost? 
Risk 
rationed 
Price 
rationed 
    Yes No 
True 
Yes No 
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rationed, with 10.3% quantity rationed and only 4.89% transaction cost rationed. 
These results are shown in Table 5. 
 
Ration Status Frequency Percent 
Price  541 46.4 
Quantity  120 10.29 
Risk  448 38.42 
Transaction Cost 57 4.89 
Total 1,166 100 
Table 5: Frequency of each ration category among the surveyed households. 
Next, we explain the empirical strategy and variable choice for the analysis of 
determinants of credit rationing status, and uptake analysis. 
Empirical Strategy 
In this section we will go over the empirical strategy for both analyses we 
conduct. First we well explain the strategy for the analysis of the determinants of 
household credit rationing status, then we will go over the strategy for the uptake 
analysis. 
Determinant Analysis Methods 
After successfully partitioning the survey population into ration status 
categories, we are able to utilize the socioeconomic and production data gathered by 
the background survey to analyze the determinants of credit rationing status. Since this 
analysis is concerned with the breakdown of households across the four rationing 
groups, it makes sense to simultaneously estimate coefficients through a multinomial 
logit. We drop the price rationed group to normalize the comparative results for the 
quantity, risk, and transaction cost rationed. In the model world, which we aim to 
achieve, all borrowers and non-borrowers are price rationed, so comparing the other 
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rationing groups to the price rationed group helps to simplify the interpretation of the 
coefficients.  By leaving out the price rationed group the multinomial logit results 
answer the following question:  
Relative to those households that interact with credit markets 
in an optimal way (from a systems perspective), is this ration 
group significantly more correlated with the variable in 
question, xi? 
Following from Boucher et al. (2009), we use a simple single equation multinomial 
logit: 
𝑌𝑖𝑗 = 𝐶 + 𝛽𝑗′𝑋𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗 
Where 𝑌𝑖𝑗 is a categorical variable that represents the propensity of household i to be 
in rationing category j. 𝛽𝑗  is a vector of parameters associated with jth rationing 
category and Xi is a vector of household i’s socioeconomic characteristics collected 
from the survey. In order to check for robustness and ease in interpretation of results, 
we follow Verteramo Chiu et al. (2014) and also run individual bivariate Logit models 
and linear probability models. These regressions take the form: 
𝑌𝑖 = 𝐶 + 𝛽′𝑋𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
Where 𝑌𝑖 is a binary variable that represents the propensity of household i to be in the 
rationing group in question, 𝛽 is a vector of parameters, and Xi is a vector of 
household i’s socioeconomic characteristics collected from the survey. All three of 
these models are run with robust standard errors clustered on the location level to 
account for unmeasured correlations among those households in the same location. 
Across all variables, we have the following hypotheses: 
𝐻0: 𝛽𝑗 = 0 𝐻1: 𝛽𝑗 ≠ 0 
The variables included in Xi  are listed in Table 6. It is important to note that the values 
for these variables are self-reported for each household and therefore subjective. 
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While it could be useful to have third party verified data, particularly for the 
agricultural variables, for the purposes of this study the subjective values are 
preferred. This is because a household’s rationing status is based on a subjective view 
of the world, this is especially true of the risk rationed as they are concerned with their 
perceived risk of collateral loss. This is not necessarily equal to their actual risk of 
collateral loss. 
 
Variable Description 
Age The age of the head of household 
Education Highest level of education for head of 
household 
Female Binary variable =1 if head of household is 
female 
Household Adults Number of adults living in household 
Household Size Number of people living in household 
Total Acres Total acres a household farms 
Maize per Acre Production of maize in rainy season per 
acre 
Plots Number of different plots farmed 
Ownership Percentage of plots farmed the household 
owns 
Average Distance Average distance from household to plots 
they farm 
Productive Subjective productive asset (animals used 
in agricultural production) value. Scaled 
by 10,000 for ease of interpretation 
Livestock Income Value of income from livestock sales over 
last 12 months. Scaled by 10,000 for ease 
of interpretation 
Percent Food The percentage of household expenses 
spent on food 
Subjective Welfare Subjective score on scale of 1-5 of 
economic standing 
Risk Aversion Outcome of risk game on scale of 1-5, 1 
being risk averse, 5 being risk seeking 
Table 6: Description of socioeconomic variables used in determinant analysis. 
Next we move onto a description of the uptake analysis methods. 
Uptake Analysis Methods 
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The uptake analysis is concerned with evaluating the effectiveness of the RCC 
product in inducing greater participation in the credit markets by the risk rationed and 
more generally any correlations between the various rationing groups and uptake of 
credit. In order to answer these questions we utilize (A) descriptive statistics of uptake 
across rationing groups, (B) descriptive statistics of uptake across product offerings, 
and (C) a logit regression to evaluate both ration status and product offered on uptake.  
This last analysis is what we will spend our time explaining here. Before going 
into the regression characteristics though, the control group was dropped before any 
uptake analysis was conducted. This is because these households were not offered any 
credit access and their inclusion would bias results. The logit regression model is as 
follows: 
𝑌𝑖 = 𝐶 + 𝛽𝑗′𝑋𝑖 + 𝛾𝑗′𝐴𝑖 + 𝜗𝑗′ 𝑍𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
Where 𝑌𝑖 is a binary variable stating whether household i accepted a loan, Xi is a 
vector of binary ration status variables, 𝐴𝑖 is a vector of binary uptake variables for 
different credit products and 𝑍𝑖 is a vector of socioeconomic variables to absorb noise. 
𝛽𝑗 , 𝛾𝑗 , and 𝜗𝑗 are vectors of parameters associated with each variable classification. 
Similarly to the determinant analysis, standard errors are clustered at the location level 
and we also run the same model as an OLS as a robustness check. An important note 
here, we do not include the price rationed in or the normal credit offering in the 
regressions such that the results are relative to these groups. They are chosen because 
they represent (A) “normal” interactions with credit markets, and (B) “normal” credit 
products. This allows us to detect any effects that being credit rationed has on uptake 
of credit and any effects that being offered RCC had on uptake relative to a normal 
credit product. Across the three categories of variables, we have the following 
hypotheses: 
𝐻0: 𝛽𝑗 = 0 𝐻1: 𝛽𝑗 ≠ 0 
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𝐻0: 𝛾𝑗 = 0 𝐻1: 𝛾 ≠ 0 
𝐻0: 𝜗𝑗 = 0 𝐻1: 𝜗𝑗 ≠ 0 
For clarity the individual variables in each of the three categories of variables included 
in the regression can be found in table 7. 
 
Category Variables 
Xi 
Ration Status 
Risk Rationed 
Quantity Rationed 
Transaction Cost Rationed 
𝑨𝒊 
Type of Credit Product Offered 
RCC 
RCC with 75% Subsidy 
RCC with 50% Subsidy 
RCC with 25% Subsidy 
𝒁𝒊 
Socioeconomic and Production 
Variables to Control Noise 
Age 
Education 
Female 
Household Adults 
Household Size 
Total Acres 
Productive Assets 
Percent of Income Spent on Food 
Subjective Welfare 
Table 7: Variables used in the uptake analysis, broken into the three categories used in regression. 
Additionally, beyond the regression analysis we also utilize contingency tables 
and calculate odds ratios to further explore the differences in uptake between normal 
credit and RCC credit products within the rationing groups. We now move on to our 
discussion of the results. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
RESULTS  
Determinant Analysis Results 
Following the empirical strategy found above, the coefficients from the 
multinomial logit, individual bivariate logits and individual bivariate OLS regression 
analyses tell a mostly consistent story. The regression results are reported in Tables 8, 
9, and 10. For ease of understanding, in the discussion that follows we will mainly 
discuss the linear probability coefficients, noting the odds from the logit regression 
and results of multinomial logit when they are not in agreement with the linear 
probability coefficients – in terms of either significance or sign. These occasions are 
limited. We will also touch on the multinomial results when their potential story due to 
normalizing over the price rationed group is especially suggestive.  
One shortfall of the linear probability model is that occasionally the predicted 
probabilities land outside the 0,1 theoretical range, however, since this analysis has an 
explanatory purpose instead of a predictive purpose we are comfortable with this 
limitation. The benefit of utilizing the linear probability model is that the coefficients 
can be interpreted as direct marginal effects (Verteramo Chiu et al., 2014). In addition 
to the tables reported below, we also run a multinomial logit with only three rationing 
groups (price, quantity, and risk rationed) as well as a logit where we combine the 
quantity rationed and risk rationed groups into a singular constrained group and have 
included these results in appendices 2 and 3. These results reach similar conclusions to 
those we report in detail here. We will now discuss the explanatory variable 
coefficients in turn with the various rationing groups. 
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Age is not significantly correlated with any of the rationing groups across the 
regressions. This suggests that there may not be learning over time that effects how a 
household interacts with the credit markets.  
Education is significant at the .05 level for price rationing, suggesting that the 
more education the head of household has the more likely they are to interact with the 
credit markets in the expected way. Additionally, in the multinomial Logit, education 
is negatively associated with the risk rationed group at the 5% level. In the linear 
probability model, this significance is at 10.9% and in the bivariate logit it is at 10.5%. 
This suggests that those with less education are more likely to be risk averse and/or 
unable to understand the conditions surrounding potential loss of collateral.  
Having a female head of household is negatively associated with being 
quantity rationed at the 5% confidence level. This could suggest that microfinance 
programs aimed at empowering women in Kenya are having their desired affect as 
women-led households are finding it easier to be approved for credit compared to 
men-led households.  
While there was no significance in the linear probability models for the 
number of household adults’ variable, in both of bivariate and multinomial Logit the 
more adults, the greater the association to the transaction cost rationed group. This 
could suggest entrenchment to the status quo and biased beliefs from earlier contact 
with less efficient microfinance lenders.  
When looking at household size (population), price rationed is significantly 
and  negatively associated at the 10% level in the bivariate logit model and just outside 
in the linear probability model (p=0.118). This may suggest that households with more 
people have greater survival costs and are less likely to be offered a loan or less 
willing to risk collateral. The first idea, that the greater the household size the less 
likely a household is to be offered a loan has further evidence in multinomial Logit 
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model where household size just misses significance at the 10% level for quantity 
rationed as compared to price rationed (p=0.102).  
Next, looking at total acres, we see broad consensus across the models that the 
more acres a household farms the less likely they are to be risk and transaction cost 
rationed. This makes theoretical sense because of the decreasing marginal utility of 
farmland. The more farmland a household has, the less important collateralizing some 
land to secure a loan becomes.  
Maize production per acre is insignificant across all models and all rationing 
statuses. This is interesting because theoretically, we would assume that those with the 
greatest yields would either (A) already be accessing the credit markets to finance 
improved technologies such as high-yielding seeds and fertilizers and therefore be 
price rationed, or (B) have self-financing capabilities due to greater market penetration 
and therefore also be price rationed.  
The next variable, number of plots, also showed no significance across 
models and rationing statuses. The variable, number of plots, can be understood in two 
ways. It could be that the more plots a household farms, the greater their production 
capacity is. However, it could also be interpreted as the greater the number of plots, 
the less efficient the production operations are. We tend to believe that more plots 
signals inefficiency and this results combined with the results for the maize production 
per acre variable suggest that the interaction between production efficiency and credit 
rationing status could be a potentially interesting line of inquiry for future research. 
Ownership of the land a household farms is negatively associated with a 
household being in the transaction cost group in both the logit and multivariate logit 
models at the 5% level. This may suggest that households with titles have more 
familiarity with paperwork, or having titles is required for the paperwork. This is 
another area where more study could be directed.  
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Average distance to farmland is insignificant across models and rationing 
statuses. This variable fits into the discussion of the relationship between agricultural 
production efficiency and credit rationing. The fact that there does not appear to be a 
relationship between a household’s farming efficiency and their credit ration status is 
puzzling.  
Moving onto productive assets, which is a subjective valuation of a 
household’s productive livestock assets useful in agriculture, we find that it is 
negatively associated with the risk and quantity rationed groups across models. This is 
as expected because on the one hand, the fewer productive assets a household has, the 
more valuable those assets are to the household and the more risk averse they will be 
around loan agreements that involve collateralizing their assets. On the other hand, if a 
microfinance institution or rural agricultural bank sees that a household doesn’t have 
the assets needed to collateralize a loan, they may not offer a contract, pushing the 
household toward the quantity rationed group. Secondarily, we find productive assets 
are positively associated with price and transaction cost rationed. This is as expected 
for the price rationed, as it is the flip side of the coin from the quantity and risk 
rationed theorization. That the transaction cost rationed are more likely to have more 
productive assets is a trickier result to explain and we will not hypothesize on the 
reasoning behind it as its not core to the analysis.  
Livestock income is significantly, at the 1% level, and negatively associated 
with being in the transaction cost rationed group across the logit models, and 
positively associated at the 5% level with the price rationed group in the linear 
probability model. Taken together, these results suggest that the more income a 
household makes from the sale of livestock, the more likely they are to interact with 
the credit market as expected, possibly because of greater familiarity with market 
transactions. 
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Of particular interest in the context of risk contingent credit are the results for 
the percentage of income spent of food coefficient estimations. Across two of the 
three models this variable is significantly associated with the risk rationed group at the 
10% level (logit p value =0.106). The greater the share of food in the household’s 
budget, the more risk averse they act by not risking collateral in order to gain access to 
credit. They have tight budgets and this can result in a focus on safe, low-yielding 
production methods instead of high-growth methods and also increases the utility of 
their productive assets, which shifts their utility calculation resulting in zero effective 
demand even if they have notional demand for credit. This result suggests a 
consideration for other markets that risk contingent credit may be particularly well 
suited to serve. 
Another especially important variable for risk contingent credit is the 
subjective welfare variable. In the regression results, the coefficient is significantly 
associated to the price rationed group (5% level), suggesting that the higher in society 
a household sees themselves being the more likely they interact with the credit 
markets as expected. Looking at the both the bivariate and multinomial Logits this 
story is confirmed with greater and more powerful evidence. In the multinomial Logit, 
the quantity, risk, and transaction cost rationed groups are all negatively associated 
with subjective welfare, meaning that relative to those who interact with the credit 
market as expected, those that view their society level as being lower are more likely 
to rationed. 
Finally, the risk aversion variable is not significantly associated with any of 
the rationing groups. We believe that this is due to a poor proxy, especially in the view 
of other results with implications for risk averseness.  
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 Multinomial 
Logit Results (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES price Quantity_rationed Risk_rationed transaction_cost 
age 
 
0.007 0.008 0.010 
  
(0.259) (0.205) (0.394) 
education 
 
-0.028 -0.056** -0.042 
  
(0.280) (0.043) (0.352) 
female 
 
-0.425 0.198 0.212 
  
(0.168) (0.282) (0.652) 
hh_adults 
 
-0.164 -0.048 0.147* 
  
(0.243) (0.516) (0.097) 
hh_size 
 
0.134 0.060 0.041 
  
(0.102) (0.286) (0.554) 
total_acres 
 
-0.002 -0.041** -0.088** 
  
(0.920) (0.026) (0.018) 
maize_per_acre 
 
-0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
  
(0.489) (0.320) (0.563) 
plots 
 
-0.112 0.063 0.164 
  
(0.322) (0.449) (0.244) 
ownership 
 
-0.295 -0.514 -1.392** 
  
(0.504) (0.226) (0.019) 
ave_dist 
 
-0.026 -0.127 -0.276 
  
(0.890) (0.470) (0.404) 
productive 
 
-0.027** -0.019** 0.032** 
  
(0.029) (0.033) (0.015) 
l_income 
 
-0.002 -0.027 -0.285*** 
  
(0.913) (0.396) (0.000) 
percent_food 
 
-0.660 0.428* 0.397 
  
(0.390) (0.088) (0.711) 
sub_welfare 
 
-0.423** -0.202* -0.554*** 
  
(0.029) (0.059) (0.010) 
ra 
 
0.032 -0.023 -0.050 
  
(0.733) (0.611) (0.483) 
Constant 
 
0.577 1.011 -0.077 
  
(0.652) (0.114) (0.960) 
     Observations 1,144 1,144 1,144 1,144 
Robust pval in parentheses 
  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  Table 8: Results from the determinant analysis via a multinomial logit regression.  
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Logit Results          
VARIABLES price quantity risk trans 
          
age -0.007 0.003 0.005 0.006 
 
(0.168) (0.682) (0.354) (0.567) 
education 0.050** 0.000 -0.047 -0.013 
 
(0.019) (0.999) (0.105) (0.780) 
female -0.098 -0.549* 0.247 0.145 
 
(0.559) (0.064) (0.155) (0.764) 
hh_adults 0.049 -0.149 -0.031 0.186** 
 
(0.366) (0.323) (0.710) (0.042) 
hh_size -0.071* 0.105 0.030 0.004 
 
(0.082) (0.266) (0.592) (0.958) 
total_acres 0.031 0.006 -0.035* -0.090** 
 
(0.108) (0.573) (0.055) (0.012) 
maize_per_acre 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 
(0.268) (0.578) (0.548) (0.667) 
plots -0.033 -0.137 0.069 0.150 
 
(0.692) (0.195) (0.340) (0.216) 
ownership 0.577 0.049 -0.305 -1.102** 
 
(0.142) (0.912) (0.387) (0.021) 
ave_dist 0.120 0.041 -0.098 -0.206 
 
(0.480) (0.804) (0.487) (0.469) 
productive 0.014 -0.020* -0.018** 0.038*** 
 
(0.138) (0.071) (0.025) (0.002) 
l_income 0.034 0.006 -0.019 -0.263*** 
 
(0.161) (0.696) (0.547) (0.000) 
percent_food -0.234 -0.900 0.495 0.216 
 
(0.408) (0.227) (0.106) (0.834) 
sub_welfare 0.278** -0.287 -0.065 -0.388** 
 
(0.016) (0.105) (0.404) (0.031) 
ra 0.014 0.044 -0.025 -0.048 
 
(0.758) (0.615) (0.552) (0.484) 
Constant -1.621** -0.782 0.124 -1.612 
 
(0.027) (0.499) (0.787) (0.228) 
     Observations 1,144 1,144 1,144 1,144 
Robust pval in parentheses 
  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  Table 9: Results from individual logit regressions for each rationing status. 
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Regression Results       
VARIABLES price quantity risk trans 
          
age -0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 
 
(0.274) (0.788) (0.493) (0.482) 
education 0.012** -0.000 -0.011 -0.001 
 
(0.028) (0.950) (0.116) (0.702) 
female -0.028 -0.045* 0.064 0.009 
 
(0.487) (0.069) (0.154) (0.711) 
hh_adults 0.011 -0.013 -0.006 0.009 
 
(0.393) (0.346) (0.741) (0.141) 
hh_size -0.015 0.009 0.005 0.001 
 
(0.118) (0.319) (0.678) (0.836) 
total_acres 0.003 0.001 -0.003* -0.001 
 
(0.115) (0.592) (0.062) (0.297) 
maize_per_acre 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 
(0.327) (0.546) (0.659) (0.684) 
plots -0.006 -0.011 0.014 0.003 
 
(0.748) (0.183) (0.333) (0.554) 
ownership 0.140 0.004 -0.079 -0.065 
 
(0.147) (0.914) (0.342) (0.233) 
ave_dist 0.031 0.002 -0.025 -0.008 
 
(0.446) (0.886) (0.438) (0.514) 
productive 0.003** -0.001 -0.003** 0.001 
 
(0.035) (0.171) (0.020) (0.311) 
l_income 0.004** 0.000 -0.002 -0.002 
 
(0.014) (0.875) (0.280) (0.135) 
percent_food -0.078 -0.076 0.138* 0.017 
 
(0.247) (0.272) (0.076) (0.752) 
sub_welfare 0.067** -0.028 -0.020 -0.019 
 
(0.028) (0.106) (0.272) (0.202) 
ra 0.002 0.004 -0.005 -0.002 
 
(0.823) (0.622) (0.619) (0.526) 
Constant 0.115 0.233* 0.532*** 0.120 
 
(0.502) (0.051) (0.000) (0.163) 
     Observations 1,144 1,144 1,144 1,144 
R-squared 0.059 0.013 0.041 0.016 
Robust pval in parentheses 
  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 Table 10: Results from individual OLS regressions for each rationing status. 
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Uptake Analysis Results 
We now move onto the results of the uptake analysis. First, we will go over 
some descriptive statistics and then analyze the regression results. Over the course of 
the RCT, Equity Bank distributed loans to 266 households. Figure 5 shows loan 
acceptance by ration status. Unsurprisingly, the price rationed were most likely to 
accept a loan, with 35.6% acceptance rate. The quantity rationed had a 34.1% 
acceptance rate, then the risk rationed had 30.4% and the transaction cost rationed had 
a 16.2% acceptance rate, but with a much smaller base. Table 11 shows the acceptance 
rate across the credit products that were offered in the RCT. The standard RCC 
product had a higher acceptance rate than the traditional credit, and interestingly the 
greater the subsidy on the RCC, the lower the acceptance rate. The effects of the 
subsidy on usage of credit, and livelihood outcomes could be an area for more 
exploration. One interpretation of the lack a positive effect of subsidies on uptake of 
credit, could be that the study population has highly inelastic demand for credit and 
they are not price sensitive when it comes to agricultural loans.   
 
Figure 5: 
Breakdown of 
loan acceptance 
by ration status. 
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Table 11: Breakdown of loan 
acceptance by type of credit 
product offered. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Turning our attention now to the regression analysis described in the empirical 
strategy section, we find some puzzling results. The regression results are located in 
Table 12, and we report on both the logit and OLS coefficients. For robustness, we 
also run the regressions with only those offered regular credit and with only those 
offered an RCC product. These results can be found in appendices 4 and 5, but we will 
pass on discussing them in detail as they corroborate the same story as the other 
regressions. As we look over the results, it’s important to remember that they are 
normalized over the price rationed for the rationing groups, and normal credit offered.  
Surprisingly, the regression does not show any significant correlation between 
whether a household chose to accept credit and both (A) being either risk or quantity 
rationed and (B) the type of RCC they were offered. While being transaction cost 
rationed is negatively associated with credit uptake at the 1% level, there are so few of 
the transaction cost rationed in our study pool that it could skew the results. None of 
the types of RCC are statistically significantly correlated with uptake, however, it is 
still worth noting that RCC with a 75% subsidy was negatively associated with uptake 
while the others were positive. The only other variable that is significantly associated 
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is the maize per acre variable at the 5% level. This means that those who are most 
efficient at production are also those who are more likely to use credit.   
VARIABLES Logit OLS  
risk -0.161 -0.035  
 (0.511) (0.515)  quantity -0.020 -0.006  
 (0.934) (0.916)  trans -1.032*** -0.181**  
 (0.005) (0.012)  rcc 0.262 0.055  
 (0.194) (0.233)  rcc75 -0.351 -0.065  
 (0.434) (0.430)  rcc50 0.229 0.048  
 (0.548) (0.573)  rcc25 0.416 0.087  
 (0.177) (0.250)  age -0.004 -0.001  
 (0.583) (0.587)  education 0.012 0.003  
 (0.719) (0.737)  female -0.199 -0.039  
 (0.315) (0.344)  hh_adults 0.065 0.014  
 (0.410) (0.433)  hh_size -0.022 -0.005  
 (0.573) (0.573)  total_acres -0.013 -0.002*  
 (0.227) (0.079)  maize_per_acre 0.001** 0.000*  
 (0.030) (0.057)  productive 0.004 0.001  
 (0.484) (0.553)  percent_food -0.564 -0.115  
 (0.151) (0.181)  sub_welfare 0.090 0.017  
 (0.427) (0.475)  Constant -0.798 0.315*  
 (0.302) (0.081)  Observations 816 816  
Robust pval in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 12: Logit and OLS regression output from 
uptake analysis. 
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We also look into the odds ratios for the price, quantity and risk rationed groups to 
see if there is a difference in uptake between those who are offered normal credit and 
those who are offered one of the RCC products. To do this, we pool the standard RCC 
product and the subsidized products into one group and then create contingency tables 
(Tables 13, 14, 15) that compare the credit products on the vertical axis and the uptake 
across the top axis for each of the rationing groups. Then from the results of the 
contingency tables we are able to calculate the odds ratios for each group using the 
following formula: Odds ratio: 𝜃 = (𝑛11 ∗ 𝑛22)/ (𝑛12 ∗ 𝑛21). For each of the rationing 
groups the odds ratios tell us that: 
• Among risk rationed households, the odds of declining the credit offer for 
those offered normal credit was 1.24 times the odds for those offered RCC. 
• Among quantity rationed households, the odds of declining the credit offer for 
those offered normal credit was .92 times the odds for those offered RCC. 
• Among price rationed households, the odds of declining the credit offer for 
those offered normal credit was 1.27 times the odds for those offered RCC. 
 
Risk Rationed 
Uptake  
Declined Accepted Total 
Credit 
Product 
Normal 
Credit 96 37 133 
RCC Credit 119 57 176 
 Total 215 94 309 Table 13: Contingency Table for the risk rationed group. 
 
Quantity Rationed 
Uptake  
Declined Accepted Total 
Credit 
Product 
Normal 
Credit 24 13 37 
RCC Credit 34 17 51 
 
Total 58 30 88 
Table 14: Contingency Table for the quantity rationed group. 
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Price Rationed 
Uptake  
Declined Accepted Total 
Credit 
Product 
Normal 
Credit 112 54 166 
RCC Credit 134 82 216 
 
Total 246 136 382 
Table 15: Contingency Table for the price rationed group. 
The analysis shows inconclusive evidence of increased uptake of credit due to 
households being offered RCC as compared to regular credit. However, the lack of 
significance for the risk rationing and quantity rationing variables means that these 
households were acting in a similar manner as the price rationed. One interpretation is 
that the intervention successfully moved the quantity rationed and risk rationed onto 
the demand curve, but that the type of credit product offered did not have an effect on 
uptake of loan. Combined with results saying that the subsidy did not have an effect 
on uptake, there would appear to be pent up, and inelastic, demand across all of the 
rationing groups for agricultural credit. This highlights the importance of extending 
agricultural financial markets in developing countries, regardless of the form it takes.  
This result is not to suggest that RCC is not a needed advancement in 
agricultural finance in developing countries, but it does suggest a deeper look into 
credit rationing groups to better understand any differences in how they interact with 
credit markets. It will also be good to continue testing RCC in similar parts of Kenya 
in order to have a better sense of the effects of RCC over time. Would there be a 
difference in demand in years following payouts from the insurance? It will be 
interesting to see what additional insights the follow-up survey will tell us about how 
the consumers view RCC, particularly because of the presence of basis risk that the 
trial experienced, which will be discussed in greater detail in the next chapter.  
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CHAPTER 5 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
 We have just reviewed the results of the two analyses that were conducted in 
order to gained a better understanding of whether or not there are key determinants 
that are significantly correlated with a household ending up in any of the four 
rationing groups and the effect that a household being in these rationing groups and 
the type of credit product they were offered had on their likelihood of accepting a 
loan. These analyses were based on data collected in the Machakos region of Kenya as 
part of the SATISFy project, which is an RCT to evaluate the potential of RCC to 
open access to credit markets for households who may not have entered credit markets 
before due to the risk of collateral loss.  
 First, we will discuss the results of the determinant analysis. It can be said that 
the most interesting take away from the determinant analysis is how uninteresting the 
results are. There are few variables that are significantly associated with a household 
being in one ration group over another, and when variables are significantly associated 
with a rationing group, the results confirm what intuition would suggest. For example, 
in the multinomial logit regression the higher a household’s subjective welfare the 
more likely a household will be price rationed as compared to the other three rationing 
groups. With respect to the risk rationed, who are the target population for RCC, the 
greater the acreage and productive assets the less likely a household will be risk 
rationed, suggesting decreasing marginal utility of both these assets and greater 
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willingness to risk putting them up as collateral in a lending contract. Additionally, 
one other result from this analysis that deserves special attention is the fact that female 
headed households are less likely to be quantity rationed meaning that they are less 
likely to be locked out of credit markets due to supply-side constraints. This suggests 
that the MFIs with a mandate to lend to females are having their intended impact in 
this region of Kenya.  
 A few of the other results suggest areas for deeper analysis and study in the 
future. Particularly, the results with relation to the percentage of income spent on food 
variable, that the greater this percentage, the more likely a household is to be risk 
rationed can be used to analyze other markets to determine where RCC may be well-
suited to increase access to credit markets. Additionally, the results suggest that there 
is not a link between agricultural production efficiency and how a household interacts 
with the credit markets. This is not immediately intuitive and one would expect there 
to be links between these two variables. Future research into this relationship will help 
us better understand the true nature of credit rationing and how it affects households’ 
interactions with credit markets.  
 Moving on to the uptake analysis, the questions we were most interested in 
answering were: Are there material differences between the credit rationing groups 
and their interactions with the credit markets, and does being offered RCC increase 
likelihood of a household accepting a loan. In this intervention, there was no 
difference between the acceptance of credit for the price, quantity, and risk rationed. 
This means that the broad intervention, offering households access to credit, was 
successful in moving the risk and quantity rationed onto the demand curve, where they 
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acted in a similar manner to the price rationed. One question this raises is whether 
there is actually a difference between the ration groups in how they interact with credit 
markets or whether these divisions are artificial and merely academic curiosities. This 
is an area where deeper research should be conducted. 
The prior result, combined with the fact that the varying levels of subsidy on 
the RCC product had no effect on uptake, suggests that there was pent up and inelastic 
demand for credit among the study population. Since this was the first time that many 
of the households had access to a loan, it may not be surprising to have found that no 
matter their ration status, they were interested in accessing the loan in an attempt to 
increase their agricultural productivity and therefore welfare. This makes interpreting 
the fact that being offered RCC did not lead to greater uptake as compared to when 
households were offered a normal credit product more difficult. It is obvious though, 
that there is a need to expand access to credit for agricultural households in developing 
countries.  
On this front, there is good news as an increasing number of firms are looking 
to extend these services. For example, the Initiative for Smallholder Finance, and the 
organizations in the Propagate Coalition are actively developing funds and strategies 
to deliver both credit and insurance to smallholders in emerging markets. More work 
will need to be done to determine the optimal place in the agricultural finance value 
chain for insurance to be available, but as mentioned earlier, it is increasingly clear 
that insurance markets and credit markets need to be developed in unison for the 
greatest success in delivering services.  
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The RCT that delivered the data used in the above two analyses was well-
developed and executed in good faith. However, that does not mean there were not 
challenges that arose through the process. We will now discuss these challenges and 
limitations quickly in order to give the reader an understanding of key lessons learned 
and to inform future studies into the efficacy of RCC.  
First, while it was emphasized to the farmers during the pre-training for the 
RCT that they would not be receiving cash, rather a loan would be advanced to the 
local agro-dealer’s account, many of the farmers still expected to get cash payments 
and some dropped out when it became clear to them that this was not the case. 
Another potential cause for concern is that the farmers who were randomly drawn to 
be in the control group, and therefore were not offered credit, may have attempted to 
influence their neighbors who were offered credit to not accept it in solidarity. There is 
evidence that some farmers in the control group expressed frustration and were 
attempting to exert influence on others to decline. In future experiments, the control 
group could be those who were only offered normal credit as compared to RCC. One 
last issue that arose in this RCT was that the project started later than expected and 
therefore left little turnaround time between when credit offers were extended and 
optimal planting time, meaning that the production cycle may have been affected for 
some farmers.  
Another consideration for future experiments examining RCC is to have a 
larger pool of randomly drawn households receive the subsidies. In this experiment 
this pool of participants were much smaller than those being offered fairly priced RCC 
and normal loans. With equal groups across RCC, subsidized RCC, and normal credit 
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it is possible that greater insights into the (in)effectiveness of the subsidy could be 
generated.   
Finally, as mentioned earlier, basis risk ended up being an issue with the RCC 
due to the index being a simple cumulative rainfall measure. During the crop cycle 
during which the RCT took place, initial forecasts were very positive for the harvest 
with many farmers expecting a bumper crop. However, the rainfall dried up at the 
wrong time for plant growth and while the cumulative rainfall was above the trigger 
point across the Machakos region, many farmers experienced significant losses. This 
could reduce farmer trust in RCC and by extension Equity Bank and should another 
trial in Machakos be conducted it may be met with wariness. Due to this concern, and 
because the team knew about the potential for basis risk associated with a simple 
cumulative rainfall index, they will be assisting farmers with their repayments in order 
to keep a positive image of both the product and Equity Bank.  
As the team looks to develop the next trials, there will be an updated index that 
will reduce the potential for basis risk by not only accounting for the cumulative 
rainfall, but also considering the frequency and the alignment with the crop growth 
cycle. There is still much empirical work to be done to better understand the potential 
of RCC to open access to credit markets for smallholder farmers and it will be 
interesting to see the outcome of the next trials that use this more sophisticated form of 
index insurance. Looking even farther out beyond the next round of trials for RCC, it 
will also be interesting to see if integrating RCC into a mobile money platform such as 
M-PESA in Kenya (which has captured a lion’s share of the market) would increase 
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both farmer interest/trust in the product and also reduce transaction costs and time 
delays.   
It is still early days for integrated credit and insurance solutions for 
smallholder agricultural households in Kenya and beyond. With the recognition that 
credit and insurance markets will need to be developed together to boost the livelihood 
outcomes of the targeted populations, research should continue to be conducted into 
these products as well as research into the optimal point in the value chain for the 
insurance to be offered.  
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CHAPTER 6 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 There is a global shift underway to increase access to services for those at the 
base of the economic  pyramid. A growing class of entrepreneurs, impact investors, 
foundations and development finance institutions are focused on figuring out ways to 
boost the outcomes for those at the base of the economic pyramid while also 
generating a positive financial return. Since many of the world’s poorest households 
live in rural areas and are reliant on agriculture not just for their limited income but 
also for subsistence, there is a need to develop financial products that can effectively 
be delivered to increase agricultural productivity while not overloading households 
with risk.  
This paper reported on research done into RCC, a novel financial product that 
links index insurance to microfinance loans. This research was conducted through an 
RCT as a part of the SATISFy project administered by IFPRI and Equity Bank in 
Kenya. This research adds to the growing literature that not only considers credit 
constraints that come from the supply side, but also on the constraints that come from 
the demand side. The results suggest that we need to have a better understanding of 
the credit rationing statuses: price, quantity, risk, and transaction cost rationed. Do 
these categories accurately represent how agricultural households interact with credit 
markets? Also, the results suggest that more work needs to be conducted in order to 
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understand RCC’s potential in opening up access to credit markets and the impact that 
RCC has on farmer productivity and welfare.  
 RCC is an exciting development in the drive to extend financial services to 
those at the base of the economic pyramid and its development is happening against 
the backdrop of an increasing recognition and desire of the international community to 
use the wide expanse of financial tools to generate not only financial returns, but also 
to create positive social and environmental impact as we look to develop the 
sustainable economy of the future and increase opportunities for those traditionally left 
behind. 
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APPENDIX  
Appendix 1 
The following pages contain the survey instrument used to collect the baseline 
information for the SATISFy RCT in the Machakos region of Kenya during the late 
spring/early summer of 2017. 
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Appendix 2 - Multinomial Logit determinant regression results with only three 
rationing groups. 
 
VARIABLES price Quantity_rationed Risk_rationed 
age 
 
0.005 0.006 
  
(0.359) (0.270) 
education 
 
-0.024 -0.052* 
  
(0.356) (0.081) 
female 
 
-0.454 0.170 
  
(0.148) (0.364) 
hh_adults 
 
-0.178 -0.063 
  
(0.197) (0.397) 
hh_size 
 
0.128 0.053 
  
(0.148) (0.302) 
total_acres 
 
0.001 -0.035* 
  
(0.938) (0.064) 
maize_per_acre 
 
-0.000 -0.000 
  
(0.497) (0.362) 
plots 
 
-0.122 0.050 
  
(0.277) (0.515) 
ownership 
 
-0.112 -0.324 
  
(0.809) (0.379) 
ave_dist 
 
-0.000 -0.099 
  
(0.998) (0.517) 
productive 
 
-0.029** -0.022*** 
  
(0.011) (0.008) 
l_income 
 
0.005 -0.018 
  
(0.806) (0.577) 
percent_food 
 
-0.718 0.371 
  
(0.330) (0.175) 
sub_welfare 
 
-0.359* -0.136 
  
(0.071) (0.137) 
ra 
 
0.037 -0.018 
  
(0.690) (0.686) 
Constant 
 
0.220 0.648 
  
(0.862) (0.236) 
Observations 1,144 1,144 1,144 
Robust pval in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix 3 – Determinant logit regression results for a combined constrained group 
that combines both the quantity and risk rationed.  
 
VARIABLES constrained 
age 0.006 
 
(0.238) 
education -0.046* 
 
(0.061) 
female 0.060 
 
(0.741) 
hh_adults -0.089 
 
(0.126) 
hh_size 0.069* 
 
(0.096) 
total_acres -0.021 
 
(0.262) 
maize_per_acre -0.000 
 
(0.282) 
plots 0.009 
 
(0.902) 
ownership -0.284 
 
(0.393) 
ave_dist -0.078 
 
(0.578) 
productive -0.024*** 
 
(0.003) 
l_income -0.011 
 
(0.647) 
percent_food 0.140 
 
(0.592) 
sub_welfare -0.185* 
 
(0.066) 
ra -0.006 
 
(0.902) 
Constant 1.097* 
 
(0.081) 
  Observations 1,144 
Robust pval in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
 70 
Appendix 4 – Uptake logit results using only a constrained variable that combines 
both the quantity rationed and risk rationed groups as well as combines the price and 
transaction cost rationed groups. 
 
VARIABLES uptake 
constrained -0.049 
 
(0.824) 
rcc 0.257 
 
(0.202) 
rcc75 -0.322 
 
(0.479) 
rcc50 0.202 
 
(0.605) 
rcc25 0.386 
 
(0.212) 
age -0.005 
 
(0.548) 
education 0.015 
 
(0.671) 
female -0.201 
 
(0.316) 
hh_adults 0.059 
 
(0.463) 
hh_size -0.024 
 
(0.572) 
total_acres -0.012 
 
(0.255) 
maize_per_acre 0.001** 
 
(0.028) 
productive 0.004 
 
(0.502) 
percent_food -0.560 
 
(0.168) 
sub_welfare 0.102 
 
(0.329) 
Constant -0.876 
 
(0.229) 
Observations 816 
Robust pval in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 71 
Appendix 5 – Uptake logit regression results, with only those offered RCC and 
Normal Credit as a robustness check. 
 
VARIABLES RCC 
Normal 
Credit 
   risk -0.279 -0.000 
 
(0.483) (1.000) 
quantity -0.220 0.259 
 
(0.549) (0.407) 
trans -1.376** -0.367 
 
(0.048) (0.477) 
age -0.001 -0.007 
 
(0.876) (0.535) 
education -0.007 0.051 
 
(0.873) (0.293) 
female -0.152 -0.398* 
 
(0.556) (0.054) 
hh_adults 0.025 0.127 
 
(0.805) (0.450) 
hh_size 0.004 -0.071 
 
(0.936) (0.392) 
total_acres -0.004 -0.045 
 
(0.512) (0.170) 
maize_per_acre 0.001 0.001* 
 
(0.276) (0.075) 
productive -0.012 0.030*** 
 
(0.446) (0.002) 
percent_food -0.493 -0.337 
 
(0.394) (0.546) 
sub_welfare 0.172 0.032 
 
(0.206) (0.821) 
Constant -0.663 -1.116 
 
(0.567) (0.268) 
   Observations 466 350 
Robust pval in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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